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SECTION I 
INTRODUCTION 
A desire to see new places, meet different people, and perhaps conduct some 
business on the side has been an enduring feature of civilization. However, 
international travel remained largely the province of the adventuresome or the 
very rich until the advent of modern aircraft. The second half of this century 
has seen a steady expansion of the jet set as international air travel to and 
from the United States has risen from 1.1 million passengers (1950) to 32.8 million 
(1978).* While in 1950 half the overseas visitors went by ship, by 1978 the 
ocean liner customers had decreased to less than five percent of the total travelling 
public. 
International travel is still small compared to the domestic air travel 
market. In 1938, when domestic trunks carried 1.2 million passengers, the airlines 
had two percent of the 27 billion intercity common carrier passenger miles. 
In 1950 airl ines had increased their share to 14% (of 56 billion) and by 1978 
the air share had risen to 84% (of 218 billion). In 1978, 120 million round 
trips by air were taken in the U.S., compared to 7.8 nillion U.S. citizen departures 
for an overseas destination. 
Both domestic and international traffic statistics clearly surpass growth 
in population from 1950 to 1980 (152 million to 223 million) and Gross National 
Product ($534 billion to$I,481 billion, 1972 dollars). What was responsible 
for this surge of travel? 
*"International air travel" includes U.S. citizens and aliens taking air trips 
to and from Mexico, but not Canada; presumably for historic statistical reasons. 
"Overseas" travel excludes Mexico and Canada. Puerto Rico is generally excluded 
from both sets of statistics. 
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First of all, a reasonably safe and convenient vehicle was needed. 
"Most of the people who traveled on planes in the early 1930s 'had 
damn good reason to travel,' said C. R. Smith [President of American 
Airlines]. 'Their son felT off a horse, or they had to go to Mayo's 
--that kind of thing. There wasnlt much discretionary about that 
kind of travel. I 
"Thewell-to-doflew. Since flying cost more, air travel was elite 
travel all through the 1930s. And of these, only the brave flew. 
A few might take a trip Ito see what it was like. ' Others flew 
for the exaltation earthlings were still discovering in the sky. 
"But the dominating motive for the 474,000 passenger-fl ights taken 
in 1932 was speed. It could not have been anything else, Fortune 
said, because planes were not as safe as trains, and far less 
comfortable. One in every 2,200 who travelled that year was involved 
in a flying accident. Sti 11, in 1932 a $5,000 insurance pol icy 
for a plane trip cost $2; for a train journey, twenty-five cents. 
Wives were still a powerful influence--they swayed men to stay 
off airplanes after every crash. 
"Manufa~ture.r:31 representatives were the backbone of air travel 
in the 1930s. These were men who had to travel to sell, and the 
airlines sought their patronage." (Solberg, 1979: 220-221) 
In the U.S., the DC-3 revolutionized airl ine travel. On the Atlantic, it 
was the DC6-B and DC-7 and the introduction of tourist class. When growth in 
1951 had fallen to only 8%, it appeared that the limit of people who were willing 
to pay $711 for a round-trip ticket had been reached, and Pan Am introduced tourist 
flights--followed shortly by planes that were operated in part as first class 
and in (large) part as tourist. 
" ... tourist class brought a fantastic upsurge in Atlantic air traffic 
--up 17% by 1953, 9% more by 1954, then up 19% in 1955, and 20% 
more in 1956. By 1958 low-fare air travel constituted two-thirds 
of the North Atlantic business, and Pan Am found that between 67 
and 77% of those flying tourist had never been in the air before." 
(Solberg, 1979: 347-348) 
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In fact, Juan Trippe, Pan Am1s president, said later IIthat the introduction of 
air coach ranks after lindbergh1s flight and theonset of the jetliner as the 
third major milestone of airline history.1I liThe importance of that change, which 
preceded the arrival of jets, was that for the first time the ordinary man began 
to fly with US,II Trippe said. (Solberg, 1979: 345) 
liThe increase in population, in the moneyed class, in overall income 
played its part in this swift growth ...• Tremendous promotion by 
the airlines and travel agents of economy fares and package vacations 
also had their effect.1I (Solberg, 1979: 406) 
The arrival of the jets, starting with the Boeing 707 -in October 1958 from 
New York to Paris and ending with the widebodies, did indeed result in a tremendous 
increase in travel. At last airplanes were able to fly over the weather and, 
combined with dependable fan jet engine power, the reputation of air travel for 
reliability, comfort, and safety became firmly established. Able to purchase 
economy class tickets, the public rushed in to fill the seats. By 1972, according 
to Gallup, half the people in the United States had flown at least once. 
But even in the early days of jet travel, it was the business traveller who 
* was the dominant passenger. The PANYNJ estimated in 1969 that 5% of the passengers 
took 40% of all air trips. Across the Atlantic, as late as 1965, the full-fare 
paying passenger still exceeded the discount and promotional passenger. By 1972 
this percentage had decreased to 16%, as the total of all air passengers went 
from 3 million to 13 million. (The International Air Transport Association [lATA] 
surveys indicate that 70% of business passengers pay full fare, compared to 20% 
of vacationers.) Thus, the big upswing in international travel has been in the 
pleasure travel class, while business travel has increased only slightly in the 
last decade. 
The industry is still relatively young and dynamic. Across the North Atlantic, 
the primary international travel market, going through the air surpassed travelling 
,,;': 
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. 
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on water only in 1957. Even in this relatively well established market, trends 
are subject to rapid change. Growth had been positive from year to year (averaging 
18% from 1957 to 1973, with annual increases ranging from 9% to 27%) until 1973, 
when the total traffic topped out at 14 million passengers. It was 1977 before 
1973 levels were reached again. 
Did the factors that caused growth reverse themselves, or did new factors 
appear and overwhelm past causes? Do the aggregate numbers hide differing cause 
and effect relationships? This report is an attempt to explore questions of this 
* nature. 
* The author would I ike to acknowledge the guidance and editorial advice of 
Dal V. Maddalon of NASA Langley Research Center. In addition, data provided 
by and discussions with John Feren of Douglas; George Sarames and Ron SeIter 
of Lockheed; and Dennis Mathaisel, Bob Simpson and Nawal Taneja of MIT have 
been invaluable. 
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SECTION 2 
TRAVEL GROWTH: CAUSES AND EFFECTS 
Given a choice, passengers will weigh convenience, comfort, safety, speed, 
appeal of destination, and cost in deciding how and where to travel. Not all 
people consider these factors to be of the same importance in making their decision, 
nor do they perceive these attributes in the same manner. Thus across the Atlantic 
in 1980, one can cruise on the Queen Elizabeth, take the Concorde, or fly standby 
on Laker Airlines, to name but three choices which are all in high demand, at 
least in season. 
A distinction has traditionally been made between business and personal 
travel. Business travel is most often concerned with sales and visiting company 
facilities. Attending conferences, meeting cl ients or vendors, and performing 
emergency service calls are also frequent reasons for business trips. Ever since 
the picturephone was a gleam in some futurist's eye, alarmists cry out that business 
travel is doomed with each advance in telecommunications technology. Yet the 
fact remains that employees generally consider a certain amount of travel as 
a perquisite and will find reasons to continue to climb on airplanes even when 
perfectly good three-dimensional, audio-visual links (in color) will be available. 
(This theory clearly does not apply to persons who, as part of their job, travel 
constantly; often-repeated trips across the Atlantic pall even faster than short-
haul day trips.) 
Personal travel, in turn, can be thought of as divided between pleasure 
and emergency. Emergencies are the parents observed by C. R. Smith rushing to 
see their offspring who have fallen off horses, or trips which have a similar 
degree of urgency or specific time constraint. This type of travel is generally 
independent of fare levels or economic conditions and is fairly probabil istic, 
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increasing with population growth. Pleasure travel, alternatively, is almost 
totally discretionary; i.e., the trip can be put off or not made at all. However, 
the trip is made because of a specific desire (visit long-lost relatives overseas, 
play the roulette wheel, bicycle across Ireland) or because of conditioning by 
the travel and tourism industry (ski Portillo in the summer, fly to California 
for only $88, see the USA during the Bicentennial celebration). 
Clearly different reasons underlie business and personal travel, and also 
subsets within these two major classifications. Motives for travel also vary 
with a country's state of economic development and travel infrastructure (unavail-
ability of public places to stay severely reduces the incentive to visit), as 
well as the specific travel mode (ground--private car, bus, train, etc.; air; 
water). Thus people take trains for different reasons than they take airplanes: 
they may be train buffs; they may be afraid to fly; they may prefer to see some 
of the scenery along the way. In general, however, when people travel, they 
pick the destination and the mode simultaneously; they do not first choose a 
place to visit and then contemplate a means of reaching it. For international 
travel, realistically speaking, there is no longer a modal choice. 
Given countries of similar economic development, causes for personal travel 
will vary with a person's economic status, social status, age, educational level, 
and travel experience. Human behavior, individually and in groups, is subject 
both to various degrees of constraint and self-determination, and generalizations 
about its causes and effects are always tentative and of uncertain val idity over 
time. Thus, although many general theories of travel have been proposed, none 
has been totally satisfactory. Even such seemingly simple hypotheses as, for 
example, the probable changes in propensity to travel with increasing income 
(sketched below) have no val id proof. In fact, often the 'woodwork" theory 
works as well as any other: you put in a flight from A,to B and people come 
\ 
out of the woodwork. Thus, demand is directly related t6 supply, without need 
for other explanatory variables. 
PROPENSITY 
TO TRAVEL 
~7-
/ 
/ 
PER CAPITA INCOME 
I 
I 
In economically advanced countries, a number of other factors have been held 
responsible for increased international pleasure travel. The combination of 
increasing leisure time and growing middle class has created world tourists unlike 
anything Thomas Cook envisioned when he founded his organized tours in the 1840s. 
Around then, the average work week was about 70 hours; by now, that has been cut 
in half. This, together with longer vacation periods, has made time available 
to people who choose to travel. The long-term rise in real disposable per capita 
income created a larger, more educated middle class which has more to spend on 
discretionary items such as travel. In the meantime, technological advances in 
air transportation have allowed, for example, the lowest one-way fare (in 1979 
dollars) from New York to Los Angeles to repeatedly fall from $725 (1929) to $470 
(1949) to $210 (1969) to $125-$88 (1980), while at the same time the duration 
\ 
\ 
of the trip h.:ls dropped from 25 h6,urs (1929) to 12 (1949) to 5 in the jet age. 
" 
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Psychological reasons have also been advanced for international tourism. 
People are said to travel for the sake of change; to get away from work that may 
be highly repetitious or routine and without autonomy; or even to get away from 
home and the necessary work that comes with its maintenance. People want to go 
to places that are more interesting, more exotic, more romantic, and in general 
more pleasurable than their homes. 
Whether such places actually exist is of course debatable, but the travel 
and tourism industry (tourist sites, airlines, hotels, aircraft manufacturers, 
travel agents, etc.) has learned to market its products well and gradually has 
been educating the publ ic that travel is good for you. On the West Coast, American 
advertises the charms of Boston and New York; on the East Coast, Los Angeles and 
San Francisco are featured. Other communication advances of the last century 
such as radio, television, and motion pictures have certainly not diminished 
people's curiosity about faraway places with strange sounding names. Live TV 
coverage is possible from anywhere in the world via satellites; it is no longer 
necessary to wait for the travelogue at the local cinema. Thus, people are 
conditioned to view the world as readily accessible and to consider travel not 
as a mere vacation, but as an integral part of life, and the more frequent and 
farther away, the better. 
Thus economic, technological and even subl iminal causes are at work to 
insure that international pleasure travel takes place. As global trade continues 
to expand, with multinational corporations leading the way, the manufacturers I 
representatives who were flying in the DC-3 I s in the 1930s are now travelling 
on international airlines. When business and political conditions change from 
country to country, there is more or less travel, depending on the nature of 
any company's business. One hypothesis is that as a country's gross national 
product decreases, travel from that country also diminishes (travel budgets 
are the first to feel the downturn in a company's fortunes, since they are the 
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easiest to cut). This theory can be countered by another: that as a country's 
economy encounters a slump, its salespersons should be increasing their calls 
to other countries to get rid of inventories which are not moving at home. 
Motives for business travel thus can be as capricious as those for pleasure 
travel. The manufacturers' reps flew rather than drove because they covered 
more territory per day and increased their sales more than enough, presumably, 
to offset the higher transportation costs. Today's (highly paid) executive 
flies the Concorde across the Atlantic to save three hours of travel and to 
el iminate jet lag, thus improving his productivity and well being, not to mention 
self-esteem. Since a hundred-thousand-dollar-a-year manls time is worth only 
$50 per hour, whi Ie the Concorde ca rri es a premi um o! $300 per hour versus cheaper 
alternatives on the London-New York run, clearly more than a simple dollar-
travel time savings tradeoff is made by the Concorde passenger. 
The value-of-time concept has often been used in transportation studies 
to compute the potential benefit (to society) for improving transportation 
networks (roads, rai I roads), or to estimate the potential demand for faster 
airplanes (Gronau, 1970). However, it is a theory riddled with caveats. For 
example, whose value should be considered? The individual IS? The companyls? 
Society's at large? The value also changes with the amount of time saved, 
the frequency of travel, and the use to which the time gained is put, as well 
as level of personal income. The Concordewins its share of travelers, about 
70-80 percent of whom are on business, largely because it saves not just 
three hours of travel time but because it minimizes the effects of jet lag; 
in effect, due to time zone changes, the Concorde gains a day or more. 
Conceptually, business travel should be more closely related to the avail-
ability (supply of seats) and, to a lesser degree, the quality of service (frequency 
and speed) in a market than to the price of the ticket: the fare is only one 
component of the total trip cost to the company. As in the Concorde example, 
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increased employee productivity can absorb sizeable air fares. The ability 
to get an employee there and back in a reasonable time is now a possibility 
from United States gateways to allover the world. Although there may be only 
once- or twice-a-week service to some more remote outposts, improving this 
service will not lead to more business travel. A decent supply of air 
service is a necessary condition for business travel, but it is not sufficient. 
Unlike domestic short-haul markets, where increasing frequency often leads 
to more air travel (because it becomes more attractive compared to driving), 
in long-haul international travel markets, where there is no viable alternative, 
travellers adjust their trips to meet the airlines' schedules. As noted, although 
flights and seats across the North Atlantic proliferated during the 1970s, 
business travel expanded only slightly. 
The spread of small and large multinational corporations and banks, throu~h 
acquisition of foreign companies or establ ishment of overseas branches, has fueled 
overseas travel since World War II. The 1980 exports of goods and services were 
341 billion or 13% of the US GNP, whereas in major Western European countries 
this percentage ranges from 25% to over 50%. This is natural enough: the United 
States has a large internal market, whereas European nations are forced to trade to 
surviv~. rut the interestinn trenrl is th~t in 197" the e~nnrt nprc~ntn~e w,~ only 
3% (of SS~2 billion); inoorts durin£ ~hc same period h~vc risc~ It ,poroxln~tcly 
the same rate from $59 billion to $314 billion. Thus even the United States is 
becoming more trade-oriented. Recently exports have been helped by the relatively 
cheap US dollar, while the dollar volume of imports is being made up to a larger 
degree of petroleum and related products following OPEC price increases. (The 
imports of crude oil and products rose from 1.2 billion barrels (1970) to 3.0 
bill ion (1978) while the dollar value increased from $2.8 billion to $39 bill ion.) 
However, the United States currently shows a surplus in those high value-added 
technological industries which naturally lend themselves to exporting, such as 
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aerospace products, where the US exports in 1980 were $14.6 billion compared to 
imports of $2.8 billion. As long as the US's comparative advantage persists, 
exports can be expected to continue to increase, and with it international 
business travel. 
As airlines aggressively attempt to fill their empty seats with discount 
passengers, the business traveler is faced with higher load factors and 
deteriorating service in economy class. To combat this negative image, some 
international airlines are establishing a third "business class", Other airlines 
are deliberately advertising themselves as the businessman's airline and are 
attempting to capture the high yield travelers rather than fight for the mass market. 
If businessmen perceive travel as becoming more onerous, their solution may be 
the corporate aircraft or substantial reduction of travel. In the future, new 
technology aircraft may become a powerful marketing force in attracting the 
business traveler. 
-12-
SECTION 3 
FORECASTS: METRICS OR WIZARDS? 
Unequivocally, it can be stated that without long range jet aircraft 
there would be no world tourism. Just as clearly, it can be said that many 
"other" things are at work. But how much of each thing is cause and how 
much effect? Is it possible to judge? Questions of logic arise: for something 
to be a cause, it must precede its effect; but what if more than one thing 
must be present, either sequentially or contemporaneously? Hicks (1979) 
discusses these problems of causality in economics and notes that, in economics, 
problems are not static. Events are constantly occurring which have not 
happened before and Hicks thus cautions the reader to be extremely wary 
before attempting to transplant scientific methodology to economics, even 
the type that Berlinski (1976) felicitously calls 
"The ••. metrical sciences - econometrics for economics; 
polimetrics for pol itical science; biometrics for biology; 
even cliometrics for history - whose task is to interpose 
themselves between the broad-ranging and frequently 
untestable assumptions of a given theory and the mass 
of data the theory is meant to confront." 
Is it possible to use the metrical sciences to develop a theory for 
demand of international air transportation? 
First, just as in economics, there is the problem of aggregation: 
to accurately describe the demand for travel requires a model which takes 
into account the decisions of each individual traveller. Since this is 
(currently) impossible, travellers are aggregated and biases are introduced. 
Whether this is enough to separate the resulting model from reality depends 
on the size of the aggregation errors and the overall stability of the 
model. Berl inski notes that the social and biological sciences are marked 
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by discontinuity and divergence: where gradual changes entail dramatic effects 
or where small changes in the initial conditions cause subsequent states to 
expand indefinitely. The intrinsic discontinuity and instability of society, 
politics, and economics then become an objection in principle to well-ordered 
mathematical models purporting to reflect real ity. 
Still, it appears necessary to somehow assay forecasts. After all, 
Armstrong (1978) has unearthed evidence that the fall of Rome could be attrib-
uted to the law promulgated by Emperor Constantius (A.D. 357) forbidding 
"anyone to consult a soothsayer, a mathematician or a 
forecaster .•. may curiosity to foretell the future be 
s i I enced forever." 
-
In the air transportation industry, builders of aircraft have a definite 
need for estimating how many airplanes will be bought since, without adequate 
forecasts, their planning will go astray indeed, as Wallace (1974) pointed 
out even as "Last one to leave Seattle please turn out the lights" billboards 
and bumper stickers appeared. 
Airport managers allover the world need good forecasts for facility 
planning. This is true at both ends of the scale. Overoptimistic forecasts 
have resulted in white (or gray) elephants such as Dulles (U.S.), Koln/Bonn 
(West Germany), and Mirabelle (Canada). In addition, massive master plans 
were undertaken that for a variety of reasons (not necessarily rational) 
were never executed (London's third airport, New York's fourth, and Toronto's 
second). Underestimates have caused clogged access roads, jammed terminals, 
and lack of gate space; here the list is endless. 
Airlines of course use forecasts as a matter of survival. Managerial 
actions based on bad forecasts can doom an airline, or lead to a shotgun 
merger. And finally, although by no means least of all, the U.S. government, 
which is responsible for a large part of the aviation infrastructure, requires 
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an understanding of likely future developments to make effective plans for 
aeronautical research and development, air traffic control facil ities, FAA 
towers, etc. Given these obvious customers, many air travel forecasts indeed 
have been generated over the years, even excluding those that are company 
confidential and which outnumber the publ ic ones by a large margin. 
Forecasts can be grouped by various categories according to their theoretical 
underpinnings. Chambers, Mullick, and Smith (1971), in their widely cited 
Harvard Business Review article, considered three general types: qualitative 
techniques, time series analysis, and causal models. Armstrong and Grohman 
(1972) assumed the break to be between naive and causal methods: in naive 
methods, projections are made considering data only on the variable in question, 
while in causal methods, an attempt is made to link external factors to the 
variable being forecasted. (These causal variables are then projected to 
arrive at the forecast.) Naive forecasts resemble the work of pure chartists 
on Wall Street, where the future of stock or commodity prices is predicted 
by observing only motion of the price itself. Yet chart theory is obscure 
enough to allow two technicians, looking at the same pattern, to arrive at 
different opinions, not only about the magnitude but also about the direction 
of the next price move. 
Armstrong (1978) later devised a much more elaborate classification 
scheme, starting with subjective versus objective methods (a forecast made 
using objective methods, when they are reasonably well defined, can be dupli-
cated oy a person other than the initial forecaster; this is usually not 
the case for subjective methods). The objective methods are then split lnto 
naive and causal branches, with econometrics hanging at one extremity of 
the causal branch. Many other schemes for categorizing forecasts have appeared. 
Generally, however, if it is necessary to describe forecasts, the subjective 
versus objective, or wizardry versus metrical ity, division is sufficient. 
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The theory underlying the forecasts must be carefully spelled out by both 
wizards and people using relatively conventional statistical techniques al ike. 
Unless such an explanation is provided, forecasts can be no more than extrapo-
lation. In far too many cases, the theory is discussed (sometimes perfunctorily, 
sometimes in great detail) and then it is noted that unfortunately this theory 
cannot be tested, usually due to data I imitations. Unfortunately, elaborate 
mathematical variations are then undertaken to cover the data deficiencies, 
while at the same time limiting and simplifying assumptions are made which 
totally divorce the model being perfected not only from reality but also from 
the theory that was supposed to be the basis for the forecast. No amount 
of statistical razzle-dazzle can hide the fact that what is left are common 
observations festooned with the trappings of rigorous mathematics. 
The trouble with data limitations is real enough, particularly in inter-
national travel (see, for example, Kanafani and Behbehani, 1979; Hogenauer, 
1980). Airlines and countries hide traffic data for competitive reasons. 
Economic activity data, especially for less developed countries, are unavailable 
to the level of detail necessary for metrical analysis. And everybody likes 
to keep his own set of statistics, making comparisons between countries and 
regions, if not impossible, then tedious and time-consuming. 
For example, Eriksen (1977) has developed exceedingly complex simultaneous 
equation demand models for individual longer haul U.S. domestic markets. 
The data that are required for these models to produce forecasts are so detailed 
that it is impossible to use these equations for international passengers 
without damaging the underlying theory through oversimplifying assumptions. 
Even when data are available, an interplay of effects usually exists 
which makes it difficult to determine which particular causes are producing 
changes in travel patterns. Almost all theories about travel include increased 
, 
'. 
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speed (or less travel time) as a cause for traffic growth, w,ith business 
travel generally being more sensitive to time savings. For example, in one 
of the early transoceanic forecasting models used for projecting SST travel, 
Boeing (1966) suggested using the following two formulas: 
(1) I:. log business passengers .. = I:. log P. + 1.4 I:. log peG. 
I J I I 
0.3 I:. log T .. 
I J 
o .71:.1 og y i e 1 d •• 
I J 
(2) I:. log personal passengers .. 
I J 
+ I:. 1 .7 log PCG. 
I 
= I:. log P. 
I 
1 • 2 I:. 1 og y i e 1 d .. 
I J 
0.2 I:. log T .. 
IJ 
where: 
P. 
I 
= population of originating country 
= per capita GNP of originating country PCG. 
I 
= weighted average yield on route from city to city j yiel d .. 
I J 
= fl i ght time from city i to ci ty j T •. 
I J 
Disregarding for the moment the overall validity of the models, they do 
imply that business travel is more responsive than pleasure travel to higher 
aircraft speed, less sensitive to changes in the economy, and considerably 
less affected by increases in ticket prices. 
Since any kind of econometric model ultimately needs an experimental 
demonstration of cause and effect relationships, the introduction of the 747-SP 
(Boeing Special Performance 747, slightly smaller but with the same power 
and thus able to make longer nonstop flights than the standard wide-body) 
and the Concorde would, on the surface, appear to provide an opportunity to 
test some of the travel hypotheses. 
Prior to May 1976, the New York-Tokyo market was served by daily direct 
service from Japan Air Lines (DC-B with a stop at Anchorage), Northwest Airlines 
(747 via Seattle) and Pan American (747 through San Francisco). In May 1976, 
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Pan American introduced the 747-SP as nonstop service on the New York-Tokyo 
run, reducing travel time from 17 hours to about 14 hours. It would appear 
that a ready test of travelers' sensitivity to time savings could now be 
demonstrated, but after the initial transient, a host of other issues began 
to complicate matters. The foremost was carrier image, as Japan Air Lines 
countered with a DC-10 and stepped up advertising. Since the trip still 
took about 14 hours on the SP, the promise of better service for a long flight 
on JAL was a powerful marketing gambit. The Japanese, as do other foreign 
citizens, in general, also prefer to fly on their own airline if available 
and at all competitive. Traffic patterns are also distorted by the insistence 
(strong encouragement) of governments that their employees (and contractors) 
use their national airline. 
Another external variable was the availability of myriad connections which 
were almost as fast as the one-stop direct service and which were particularly 
appealing to people who prefer (or can afford) to break their transpacific 
journey into smaller segments to make it less wearing. To these travelers, 
the availability of nonstop service was irrelevant. Further, travelers' sen-
sitivity to time savings cannot be assumed to be constant: i.e., three hours 
saved off a trip of six hours is perceived differently from three hours saved 
out of seventeen. To truly demonstrate cause and effect relationships, a 
far more controlled experiment would have to be devised than the introduction 
of the 747 SP on a competitive multi-carrier market. (In other markets where 
the SP was introduced, for example, Los Angeles-Auckland, San Francisco-Hong Kong, 
it offered no substantial time savings over standard wide body jets.) 
The Concorde case is even more complex than the SP, since the fare was 
simultaneously increased 20% over first class. When the Concorde was intro-
duced in May 1976 on the Paris- and London-to-Washington, D.C. routes, it 
was the only supersonic service across the Atlantic and it attracted not just 
-18-
the Paris/London-Washington traveler, but also connecting passengers; one-third 
of all Concorde passengers transfer at one end of their flight and another 
third at both ends (Dubin, 1978). In fact, when the Concorde was finally 
allowed to land at Kennedy Airport in New York, more than one half of the 
traffic left the Washington run. The London-Washington route has always had 
higher load factors than Paris-Washington, further indicating that passengers 
who generally had better connections in London were the mainstay of the Washington 
route (see Tables A.l and A.2 in Appendix). 
The travelers on the Concorde are predominantly on business; surveys 
undertaken by British Airways and Air France have shown consistently that 
they constitute over 70% of the passengers. One long-standing theory had 
been that the Concorde would siphon off the first-class passenger from conven-
tional jets; yet British Airways has recently claimed that first-class traffic 
has actually increased on their wide-body flights because of the marketing 
spinoff from the Concorde. tf businessmen value their time, they also value 
their money; they do not necessarily fly first class when the economy section 
gets there just as fast, although SST studies assumed that largely first-class 
traffic would be attracted to supersonic service. For example, Leyman (1979) 
estimated that, if there were a 20% surcharge over first class, 10% of economy 
and 75% of first class traffic would be diverted to SST service, given 40% 
time savings. However, business travelers use first class about 20% of the 
time; yet 80% of the economy discount business travelers surveyed were willing 
to pay a 20% surcharge to save 6-1/2 hours of a 10-hour trip (Landes and 
Matter, 1979). Even with caveats about survey techniques (i.e., it is one 
thing to talk about paying and another thing to actually do it), this indicates 
that the supersonic market may be much broader than is generally indicated 
by the standard time-value-of-money studies or the first-class-diversion 
approaches. 
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However, it is difficult to develop, and more importantly, to verify, 
a realistic diversion model based on Concorde data, because of three 
basic problems: limited data, off-line traffic, and marketing considerations. 
The data limitations apply to knowledge of demographic and socioeconomic 
characteristics of the travelers and traffic data of non-U.S. carriers. 
Off-line problems are best illustrated by the sharp drop-off in traffic 
on the London and Paris to Washington routes in December 1977 noted pre-
viously, which was not related to any airline activity on these 1 inks but 
to the introduction of Concorde service to New York from London and Paris. 
(Attempts have been made to compensate for off-line traffic; Dubin (1978) 
for example.) Attempts to quantify the Concorde share on the Paris-Riol 
Caracas and the London-Bahrein routes founder due to lack of traffic data 
and the diversity of alternative fl ights. For example, against a twice-
weekly Concorde service (Paris-Rio), Air France also flew 747s nonstop and 
one-stop three times weekly; Varig had five weekly frequencies each of 707s 
and DC-las; and Aerol ineas Argentinas had two 707 flights. In the New York-
London run in 1979, there were six daily 747s, Laker's DC-lOs and assorted 
other aircraft. 
In situations like these, where traffic flows not from city to city 
or even country to country, but continent to continent, the most reasonable 
way to assess Concorde potential is not an equation relating traffic share 
to frequencies, fares and travel times (see, for example, Swan, 1979), but 
to put the woodwork theory to work. To be sure, it is useful to first estimate 
the transoceanic business flows and guess at the total that might be diverted 
to a higher speed aircraft to make sure that the planes will not fly empty, 
but ultimately the load factors will be determined by the convenience of 
the service for the business travelers. Thus the Concorde is in high demand 
on the New York runs, but weak on other routes where alternative service 
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is comparable. By providing more attractive transatlantic service, Concorde's 
percentage of United States-Europe traffic has risen from 0.45% (55,600 of 
12,082,152 in 1977) to 1.1% (168,850 of 14,868,723 in 1979). (The woodwork 
theory also argues that British Airways should keep increasing the Concorde 
New York frequency.) 
If the SP and the Concorde are not sufficiently controlled experiments 
to determine the advantage of higher speed travel due to unstable and incomplete 
data, what other recourses are available to test hypotheses about international 
travel? 
Use of aggregated data appears reasonable, and many attempts have been 
made to forecast international regional market traffic. The North Atlantic, 
the densest route, has attracted the most attention. 
On the wizard side, Bratbak (1971) looked at the North Atlantic and 
concluded that traffic was probably determined more by the travelers' perception 
of their future economic health (consumer confidence) and the availability 
of seats from year to year than anything else. 
lATA updates its regional North Atlantic five-year forecasts every June, 
averaging the guesses of many forecasts. One cannot argue (too vehemently) 
with wizards, except after the fact; the flaws in the metrical attempts are 
more apparent. 
Even when the proper causal variables are identified, i.e., the theory 
is plausible and is not mistaking correlation for causation, the equations 
assume (as causal models must) that the causal variables can be measured 
and projected accurately (more accurately than traffic itself) and that the 
relationships will remain constant. These assumptions, which are basic to 
econometricians and other metricians, are extremely questionable for inter-
national traffic forecasts. 
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Some metrical efforts (Taneja, 1971, to the more recent Cigliano, 1979) 
have attempted to statistically fit GNP, income, fare, and some measure of 
qual ity of service to North Atlantic passenger flows. Feren (1979) devised 
the following formula for German travel to the United States (for traffic, 
see Table A.3) : 
where: 
Log (GER TFV) = 1.711 + 1.236 Log (REAL WAGES) - .394 (Log YIELD) 
.982 Log (RELINF) + .063 Log (BI CEN) 
GER TFV = total foreign visitors arriving in the United States from 
West Germany 
REAL WAGES = compensation of employees in constant 1975 Deutsche marks 
R YIELD = real average fares on the North Atlantic (Europe, U.S. & 
Canada) converted to constant 1975 prices using the CPI 
of West Germany 
RELINF = a relative inflation variable measuring the change in 
prices in the United States against Germany after 
correction for exchange rate movements 
US CPI 
GERMANY CPI x 
Deutsche Mark 
U.S. Dollar exchange rate index 
BI CEN = a dummy variable to account for the traffic stimulation 
resulting from the 1976 U.S. Bicentennial 
Although statistically appealing, this equation demonstrates one major 
caveat of metrics, accurate prediction of exogenous variables. Correctly 
guessing RELINF will assure the forecaster a prosperous future not only in 
the airl ine business, but also, more lucratively, in the currency markets. 
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The problem of measurement of variables is demonstrated in U.S.-Venezuela 
traffic (Table A.4). Venezuela is in fifth place of all alien-generated traffic 
to the Uni ted States and travel has gone up by a factor of three from 1974-
1979, even though the Venezuelan bolivar is tied to the dollar, so there has 
been no relative currency advantage. Further, the Venezuelan GNP did not grow 
faster than that of the U.S.; charter flights accounted for only 1% of the 
total traffic; and business travel only accounts for about 5% of the total 
traffic, according to the not-always-reliable World Tourism Organization reports. 
What the aggregate numbers hide is the growing, ever more affluent, middle 
class in Venezuela, which can afford to travel and is taking advantage of 
the relatively cheaper goods and services which are available in the United 
States. Thus, although the gross economic indicators imply that no special 
causes for travel to the United States exist, over the course of the past 
five years the number of Venezuelans coming to the United States has tripled, 
spurred on in part by the development of Miami as a major Latin American hub; 
over half of the total U.S.-Venezuela traffic is over the Caracas-Miami 1 ink. 
While prediction and reI iability of causative variables present severe 
problems in metrical forecasting, they are not as serious as the basic 
problem of instability: even if a correct theory is postulated and the 
proper causes have been identified using rigorous analysis of historical 
facts, there is no guarantee that the past will be prologue. Perhaps here a 
touch of the wizard becomes necessary; Wallace (1979) shows a possible way 
out through indexing and looking at a range of possible events. 
In attempting to devise an explanation for the growth of the US domestic 
passenger traffic, Wallace developed two qual ity and price indexes, arguing 
that quality is as important as price for demand determination. The factors 
influencing quality include technological improvements in aircraft (speed, 
size, and range, as shown in Table I ), and growth of the airline industry 
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TABLE 1 
COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT -- TRENDS IN CHARACTERISTICS AND PRODUCTIVITY 
Type of PI ane 
Ford Tri-
Motor 
Douglas DC-3 
Douglas Dc-6 
Lockheed Constellation 
Douglas DC-7 
Lockheed Super 
Constellation 
Lockheed Electra 
Boe i ng 707 
Doug I as Dc-8 
Boeing 727-200 
Douglas DC-8-61 
Douglas DC-IO 
Boeing 747 
Concorde 
Date 
of 
Fi rst 
Service 
8/ 2/26 
6/25/36 
4/27/47 
6/17/47 
11/29/53 
4/ 1/55 
1/12/59 
10/28/58 
9/18/59 
12/14/67 
2/24/67 
8/ 5/71 
1/22/70 
1/21/76 
Full 
Payload 
Range 
(M il es) 
570 
500 
2,750 
3,000 
2,800 
4,620 
2,770 
3,000 
4,300 
1,750 
5,300 
2,760 
5,800 
3,800 
Seats 
14 
28 
56 
64 
99 
99 
98 
181 
176 
189 
259 
380 
490 
lOa 
Speed 
(mph) 
100 
180 
310 
300 
360 
335 
450 
600 
600 
600 
600 
600 
640 
1,300 
'it 
Annual 
ASM's 
(000) 
4,088 
14,717 
50,691 
56,064 
104,069 
96,842 
128,772 
317,112 
308,352 
331,128 
453,768 
665,766 
915,712 
380,000 
* Assuming a constant util ization of eight hours per day -- this actually 
overstates the capacity of older models and understates most of the jets. The 
formula for annual capacity is: seats x hours per day x speed x 365. The 
numbers derived do not reflect actual productivity in commercial service because 
mixed class seating reduces the actual seats and actual cruising speeds are about 
\ 10% under the maximum. 
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in general, reflecting service improvements (additional cities served, improved 
and more frequent schedules, more direct service). A similar composite quality 
index for international air transportation can be constructed by using C.A.B. 
data on u.s. international operations. Revenue aircraft miles in service are 
taken as a proxy for service improvements, and aircraft speed and average number 
of aircraft seats as used as proxies for technological improvement. The year 
of the introduction of the DC-7, 1953, is chosen as the base year for indexing. 
To account for inflation while simultaneously considering tick~t price 
and traveler income, the current dollar yield index (the income airlines actually 
receive per passenger-mile) is divided into the current dollar u.s. GNP index 
to establ ish the ability-to-buy index. (GNP is used rather than disposable 
income to account for both business and personal income expansion.) This index, 
as Wallace points out, measures the change in travelers' abil ity to purchase 
air travel, given the combinations of changes in prices and incomes as U.S. 
citizens actually experienced them; i.e., if wages inflated faster than airline 
yields, it became easier to purchase airline tickets. 
Using these buying and and quality indices, it is possible to construct 
an international passenger traffic model by analyzing the historical relation-
ship between these pseudo-causative variables and the passenger traffic index. 
The buying index and the quality index are shown in Figures 1 and 2. The 
supporting data are shown in Tables A.5 and A.6 in the Appendix. 
Performing a regression analysis on the data in the form: 
where: 
P. = passenger index (international passengers for year i/1953 passengers) 
I 
B. = buying index ([GNP./1953 GNP] 7 Yield./1953 Yield) 
I I I 
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-25-
o 
~ • C\I . 
xapul flu! ~n 8 
o 
OJ 
m 
to 
r--
m 
0 
r--
m 
~ 
0 
cu 
to>-
to 
m 
0 
to 
m 
to 
to 
m 
x 
w 
a 
Z 
<.!) 
Z 
>-
::::> 
(l) 
W 
a:: 
::::> 
<.!) 
lJ.. 
o 
<D 
-26-
o 0 q 0 0 q o 
I'- lO tn ¢ rtl N 
0°1 = £S61 xapul ~t!lono 
o 
<D 
en 
0 
I'-
en 
~ 
c 
IV 
tn>-
lO 
en 
0 
lO 
en 
x 
W 
Q 
Z 
>-
~ 
-l 
« 
:::> 
0 
C\I 
W 
a: 
:::> 
~ 
U. 
-27-
Q. = qual ity index (1 + [airborne speed. - 1953 speed]/1953 speed + 
I I 
[available seats per aircraft. - 1953 seats]/ 
I 
1953 seats + [aircraft revenue miles. - 1953 miles]/ 
I 
1953 miles]) 
yields the following statistics: 
a = 1.065 Standard error = 0.147 
S = 0.423 Standard error = 0.119 
T = 7.233 
T = 3.544 
The model is statistically sound. It has a good statistical fit (multiple 
R = 0.93). The F ratio is high (72.5). F ratio compares the explained variance 
(due to regression) to the unexplained variance (error sum of squares). A high 
F ratio generally indicates that all of the regression coefficients are not sta-
tistically equivalent to zero. The T statistics validate this point. Generally, 
a T statistic greater than 2.0 means that the coefficients are significant. 
The standard error of the estimate is low (0.052). Finally, the signs of the 
coefficients are correct. 
The delta log equation shows percentage changes in the passenger index 
from one year to the next related to percentage changes in B. and Q .. A com-
I I 
parison of actual and estimated passenger indices is shown in Figure 3. (The 
estimated indices are computed by yearly updates of the actual index.) 
The use of the model for forecasting is subject to the usual caveats of 
econometric models. In addition, it should be recognized that the model omits 
a number of considerations. Only US GNP is used, although by 1979 about 50% 
of the travelers were aliens. No attempt was made to construct a weighted 
GNP index since, if the model were used for forecasting, a projection of many 
countries' economic activity would then have to be made, a dubious undertaking, 
as noted previously. Additionally, the economies of other major industrial 
nations (whose citizens make up the great majority of travelers to the U.S.) 
move somewhat in tandem with the US economy (although not necessarily at the 
same rate) and the US GNP appears to serve as an adequate proxy for all. 
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The international passenger count includes charter passengers, while all 
the other variables are confined to scheduled service. Ever since the INS 
started keeping track of charter passengers in 1972, their percentage has 
remained fairly constant at only about 12% of the total traffic. 
No attempt was made to separately account for charter traffic. While 
the price of tickets for a charter flight is generally less than that of a 
scheduled carrier, the pattern of yield changes for charter carriers is similar 
to that of the scheduled carriers (Brown, 1980). 
Also neglected are travel costs that are not related to air transportation: 
food, lodging, entertainment, and ground transportation at the destination. 
Undoubtedly, the favorable exchange rates have influenced some European travelers 
to come to the United States (the Deutschmark, for example, has appreciated 
74% against the dollar from 1972 to 1980), and conversely have caused some 
American tourists to shift to less expensive countries (Taneja, 1980), although 
this phenomenon has proved hard to quantify (Mutti and Murai, 1977). Certainly 
the average length of stay of U.S. travelers in Europe decreased from 27 days 
in 1970 to 17 in 1977, but then again this is fairly universal. It also 
decreased in South America from 22 days (1970) to 14 (1977), and also in 
other overseas areas from 28 days (1970) to 20 (1977) (Miller and Font, 1975; 
Bolyard, 1979). 
Yields for U.S. international airlines only are used, whereas foreign 
airlines now carry about 5Q% of the traffic as well. Foreign airlines' yields 
are unavailable, so the question is largely moot; but since tickets cost about 
the same (excluding foreign exchange considerations), U.S. yields appear to 
be adequate as a proxy for all ticket prices. (In addition, these yields 
are calculated including income from tickets for Canadian and Mexican traffic, 
whereas Canadian border passengers are excluded from the traffic totals.) 
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The same problem exists regarding speed, available seats per aircraft, 
and aircraft revenue miles. Since foreign airlines fly equipment similar to 
that of U.S. airlines, U.S. numbers should be representative of all interna-
tional airlines. Statistical theory, at least, does not argue vehemently against 
these various simplifications and omissions. 
Based on this model, a nomograph can be constructed using indexed variables 
for GNP, yield, and quality (Figure 4). With it, is is possible to explore 
a range of values for the independent variables and quickly arrive at an 
estimate of future international travelers. No certainty of the forecasts 
is implied, but combining the variables in a logical manner should lead to 
a reasonable range of potential traffic levels. 
First a set of economic assumptions is necessary. (1978 is assumed as 
the base year.) Given current trends, a doubl ing of GNP by 1986 (GNP index = 
2.00) is possible; assuming it is fueled by inflation, it is likely that the 
yield index will keep pace with inflation (yield index = 2.00), thus main-
taining the buying index at 1.00. By 1986, however, aircraft improvements 
may lead to higher productivity (as they have traditionally in the past), 
allowing the airlines to pass the savings on to the customers, perhaps holding 
the price increases to 50% of the inflation rate (yield index = 1.5). Aircraft 
improvements and changes in airline operations will also make themselves felt 
in the quality index. Not much speed increase is anticipated; however, some 
increase in the comfort level (number of seats per aircraft) and increased 
convenience of service through the ongoing proliferation of gateways (number 
of aircraft miles) can be expected (Lockheed, 1980), perhaps ranging from 
10% to 30%. Figure 4 shows that if inflation is passed on to the customer 
and there is only a 10% improvement in quality, a four percent increase in 
international passengers can be expected. Alternatively, it can be seen 
that a 30% increase in quality and a ceiling on the yield index of half the 
GNP index leads to a rise in passenger traffic of over 50%. 
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The nomograph lends itself nicely to exploring other options. A large 
supersonic aircraft introduced in large numbers would mean a substantial 
increase in the quality index. A return to fewer gateways would imply an 
increase in the number of large widebody aircraft, impacting favorably on 
yield and comfort, but negatively on convenience; all these scenarios can 
now be quickly explored. 
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SECTION 4 
SUMMARY 
The arguments against metrical forecasts are strong, but in the 
absence of certified wizards, little else but extrapolation remains. 
Extrapolation is generally quicker and cheaper, although it is certainly 
possible to get caught in expensive computational gimmickry. The real 
trouble with extrapolation is its philosophical barrenness: it offers 
only inertia as the underlying cause. Humans like to believe that they 
can control, to some degree, their destiny, and therein lies the 
attractiveness of the metrical sciences: if the cause-effect cycle of past 
events can accurately be identified, then it may be possible to plan 
ahead: either by altering the causes (policy decisions) or by coping with 
the expected effects by forecasting (operational decisions). Finally, 
just as in the physical sciences, in the social sciences as well there 
is a basic curiosity just to find out how things tick. However, whereas 
physical sciences are (fairly) deterministic, due to the inherent instability 
and variability of human behavior it may not be possible to predict how 
things will tick -- only to discover how they have ticked. 
To compound the forecasting problem in aviation, the basic rules of 
the game are being changed. Deregulation is currently on the loose in 
the U.S., and efforts have been made to export it, with mixed success. 
Many new gateways are being opened to foreign airlines in exchange for 
liberal bi laterals (low fares), and foreign (and U.S.) ai rl ines are taking 
advantage of this possibly transient trend. However, deregulation will 
probably cause the overall quality of air travel to decline, by 
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emphasizing low yield travel to fill the empty planes. even as some 
observers are warning that the ever rising cost of fuel may make air 
transportation the province of only the rich once more (Hammarskjold. 1980). 
From Table A.6 it is apparent that yield bottomed out in 1972. and 
following the oil price increases in 1973/74. it took four years of GNP 
growth before the buying index necovered to its 1973 value. As seen 
in Figure 2. with the introduction of the 707 into the world's international 
fleets. the quality index climbed steadily at about 30% per year until 
the 747 was put into service in early 1970. The growth of the quality 
index since that time has been basically in the available-seat-per-aircraft 
component, as more wide-bodies are flying international routes. Speed has 
stayed fairly constant while the miles-flown component has decreased 
substantially, as airlines have decreased frequency of narrow-body 
airplanes. The wide-bodies helped to keep the yield down as well, due 
to their lower seat-mile costs compensating for the fuel price increases. 
With fuel prices on the rise again, help from productivity gains will become 
harder to come by until new technology aircraft appear. 
New technology aircraft will stimulate international air transportation 
by offering improvement in fuel efficiency to contain the rising fuel costs, 
but eventually this will be of limited help if fuel prices continue their 
upward climb. To maintain travel growth the economies of the world will 
have to expand faster than the yield increases to keep up the travelers' 
ability to buy air transportation. Finally, large. fuel-efficient, 
environmentally acceptable supersonic aircraft could have an impact 
on international air transportation somewhat similar to that of the jets; 
improvements in productivity and quality would once more be reflected in 
swiftly rising passenger traffic. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A.l 
Concorde Passenger Data 
A. Air France 
Pa r i s-Daka r-Rio Pa r is-Caracas Paris-Washington-Mexico City* Par is-New York 
Load Load Load Load 
Year Passengers Factor Passengers Factor Passengers Factor Passengers Factor 
1976 12,631 61.7 2,731 35.9 12,064 74.1 
1977 13,569 61.4 4,352 41.8 21 ,433 50.3 4,290 58.2 
1978 12,935 65.8 4,486 42.2 10,780 37.3 47,783 66.6 
1979 14,805 66.6 4,534 44.8 20,393 47.6 50,745 71.3 
~··Mexico added September 30, 1978 I 
B. British Airwa~ Vol 0" 
I 
London-Washington London-New York London-Bahrein-Singapore* 
Load Load Load 
Year Passengers Factor~'(~'c Passengers Factor~'c* Passengers Factor~h,( 
1976 11 ,244 75.0 6,443 42.4 
1977 27,387 64.4 2,490 71.1 4,897 37.7 
1978 12,366 42.6 64,858 72.1 6,040 26.7 
1979 15,492 53.0 (E) 82,280 72.0 (E) 18,514 65.0 (E) 
* Singapore added January 24, 1979 ** Load factor based on 100 seats 
-37-
Table A.2 
HASHINGTON - LONDON ROUTE (NON-DIRECTIONAL) 
Concorde BA 747~': PA 747* 
Freauency 
Year # Passengers per Month Passengers Passengers 
1976 6,923 11 , 158 
2 3,949 8,143 
3 5,922 9,897 
4 8,401 10,558 
5 305 4 11,724 13,114 
6 1,092 16 13,944 15,495 
7 1,432 19 16,061 15,660 
8 1 ,341 17 10,641 14, 157 
9 1,516 17 13,417 13,814 
10 2,217 27 11 ,502 12,507 
11 1,832 25 4,827 10,110 
12 1,509 25 6,085 10,421 
1977 1,469 24 5,004 11 ,874 
2 1 ,501 24 3,897 7,682 
3 2,079 27 5,783 10,731 
4 1,827 26 5,509 11 ,34O 
5 2,429 33 8,118 6,174 
6 2,559 33 9,487 15,318 
7 2,626 37 9,604 15,200 
8 1,694 34 7,047 15,686 
9 3,192 49 7,397 13,437 
10 3,915 62 10,056 12,587 
11 3,006 52 5,894 8,397 
12 1,090 24 6,770 9,028 
* 747 service by British Airways (BA) and Pan American (PA) from May 1976 was 
da i 1 y. 
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Washington-London Route (continued) 
page two 
Concorde BA 747* PA 747* 
Freauency 
Year # Passengers per Month Passengers Passengers 
1978 834 18 6,615 5,503 
2 799 21 5,025 8,298 
3 862 26 7,886 10,475 
4 989 25 9,689 12,042 
5 1 ,231 26 13,257 21,428 
6 1 ,251 26 16,011 10,067 
7 1,094 28 18,711 23,050 
8 916 26 18,071 21,427 
9 1,663 26 17,614 21 ,059 
10 1 ,405 28 15,813 16,338 
11 727 24 10,507 12,408 
12 565 16 9,323 13,210 
* 747 service by 9ri ti sh Ai rways (BA) and Pan Ameri can (PA) from May 1976 was 
da i 1 y. 
1975 
1976 
~.-
1977 
1978 
U. S. 
Flag 
TABLE A.J 
U.S. - West Germany Traffic 
TOTAL 
U.S. Citizens 
I\rrivals Departures 
Fore i gn 
Flag 
U.S. 
Flag 
752,710 
363,078 
Foreign 
Flag 
u.S. 
Flag 
1,265,727 
389,632 
Arrivals 
A I i ens 
Foreign 
Flag 
Departures 
U.S. 
Flag 
Fore i gn 
Flag 
513,017 
253,936 259,081 
175,738 187,340 184,824 204,808 92,248 161,688 90,599 168,482 
1,571 ,094 
981,128 589,966 
509,679 471,449 305,254 284,712 
301 ,580 208,099 256,814 214,635 125,702 179,552 109,161 175,551 
1,687,073 
1,050,207 636,866 
533,029 517,178 330,001 306,865 
299,625 233,404 277 ,689 239,489 136,247 193,754 115,171 191,694 
1,859,477 
1,075,241 784,236 
544,073 531,168 418,701 365,535 
266,806 277,207 257,757 273,411 168,029 250,672 133,696 23 I ,839 
2,056,456 
1,075,271 981,185 
528,758 546,513 524,700 456,485 
1979 266,669 262,089 283,748 262,765 212,015 312,685 169, I 20 287,365 
I 
\.f.j 
I.D 
I 
TABLE A.4 
U.S. - Venezuela Traffic 
TOTAL 
U.S. Citizens Al iens 
Arrivals Departures Arrivals Departures 
U.S. Foreign U.S. Foreign U.S. Fore ign U.S. Foreign 
Year Flag Flag Flag Flag Flag Fl ag Flag Flag 
402,861 
164,315 238,546 
81,223 83,092 124,035 114,511 
1975 50,417 30,806 48,511 34,581 55,723 68,312 50,157 64,354 
1i58,237 
165,325 292,912 
76,603 88,722 148,601 144,311 
1976 40,833 35,770 45,694 43,028 58,788 89,813 56,417 87,824 I ~ 
0 
563,817 I 
179, 120 384,697 
85,444 93,676 197,051 187,646 
1977 51,794 33,650 54,651 39,025 88,243 108,808 78,715 108,931 
710,756 
182,256 528,500 
84,148 98,108 271,081 257,419 
1978 53,511 30,637 63,640 34,468 135,148 135,933 122,438 134,981 
854,815 
190,423 664,392 
86,322 104, 101 344,484 319,908 
1979 54,211 32,111 67,702 36,399 181,571 162,913 165,592 154,316 
Table A.5 
1953-1979 : Selected Statistics for International Air Travel 
Per Capita 
Disposable Yi e I d for u.S. 
Personal Intll Airlines GNP Airborne AC Rev. 
Passengers Income {Current c/ (Bi II ions Speed Available Mi les 
Year (OOO) (current $) RPM) Current $) MPH Seats/AC (Mi II ions) 
1953 (FY) I ,715 ,1,571 6.84 366. I 229 52.0 114 
4 1,853 1,574 6.76 366.3 240 56.2 120 
5 2,206 1,654 6.66 399.3 244 56.4 135 
6 2,643 1,731 6.68 '.20.7 248 58. I 152 
7 3,053 1:,792 6.55 442.8 253 61.4 162 
8 3,402 I ,821 6.46 448.9 255 63.7 173 
9 4,064 1,898 6.29 486.5 263 67.5 I 172 .J:-
-I 
1960 CY) 4,902 1,934 6.35 506.0 307 89.9 163 
5,055 1,976 6.08 523.3 357 108.7 161 
2 5,752 2,058 5.87 563.8 394 118.7 172 
3 6,356 2,128 5.82 594.7 423 124.8 192 
4 7,657 2,278 5.45 635.7 441 127.2 214 
1965 8,996 2,430 5.29 688. 1 451 129.1 248 
6 10,589 2,597 5.16 753.0 468 129.3 286 
7 12,456 2,740 5.01 796.3 482 132.2 351 
8 14, 160 2,930 4.95 868.5 476 135.6 408 
9 16,605 3,111 5.18 935.5 477 138.'·9 450 
Table A.5 (continued) 
Per Capita 
Disposable Yie 1 d for U. S. 
Personal Int l l Airlines GNP Ai rborne AC Rev. 
Passengers Income (Current ¢/ (B ill ions Speed Ava i 1 ab le Mi 1 es 
Year (000) (Current $) RPM} Current $) MPH Seats/AC (Mi 11 ions) 
1970 (CY) 18,960 3,348 5.01 982.4 482 154.9 378 
20,784 3,588 5.10 1,063.4 481 184.0 351 
2 25,020 3,837 4.98 1,171.1 480 190.8 350 
3 26,659 4,285 5.32 1,306.6 481 201.5 361 
4 26,055 4,646 6.39 1,412.9 481 213.7 330 
1975 25,828 5,088 7.17 1,528.8 482 224.8 331 
6 27,101 5,504 7.15 1,702.2 484 230.0 319 
I 
7 28,505 6,017 7.61 1 ,899.5 487 236.7 315 .j::'" N 
I 
8 32,750 6,672 7.49 2,127.6 489 244.1 319 
9 37,296 7,363 7.66 2,368.5 490 (E) 250 ( E) 330 (E) 
Table A.6 
1953-1979 : Selected Indices for International Air Transportation 
Conven i ence Passenger 
Year GNP Index Yield Index Ability to Buy of Service Comfort Speed Qua 1 i ty Index Index 
1953 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
4 1 .001 0.988 1.013 0.053 0.081 0.048 1 . 182 1.080 
1955 1.091 0.974 1. 120 0.184 0.085 0.066 1.335 1.286 
6 1 .149 0.977 1.176 0.333 0.085 0.083 1 .501 1. 541 
7 1 .210 0.958 1. 263 0.421 0.117 0.105 1.643 1.780 
8 1 .226 0.944 1.299 0.518 0.181 0.114 1.839 1.984 
9 1.329 0.920 1.444 0.509 0.225 0.148 1.882 2.370 
I 
.J::-1960 1.382 0.928 1.489 0.430 0.729 0.341 2.500 2.858 w I 
1.429 0.889 1.607 0.412 1 .090 0.559 3.061 2.950 
2 1.540 0.858 1.795 0.509 1 .283 0.721 3.513 3.354 
3 1.624 0.851 1.909 0.684 1 .400 0.847 3.931 3.706 
4 1.736 0.797 2.179 0.816 1 .446 0.926 4.188 4.465 
1965 1.880 0.773 2.431 1.175 1 .483 0.969 4.627 5.245 
6 2.057 0.754 2.728 1.509 1.487 1.044 5.040 6.174 
7 2.175 0.732 2.971 2.079 1 .542 1 .105 5.726 7.263 
8 2.372 0.724 3.277 2.579 1 .608 1.079 6.266 8.257 
9 2.555 0.757 3.376 2.947 1 .671 1.083 6.701 9.682 
Table A.6 (continued) 
Convenience Passenger 
Year GNP Index Yield Index Ab i 1 i ty to Buy of Service Comfort Speed Qual i ty Index Index 
1970 2.684 0.732 3.666 2.316 1.980 1 .105 6.401 11 .055 
2.905 0.746 3.894 2.079 2.538 1.100 6.717 12.119 
2 3.199 0.728 4.394 2.070 2.669 1 .096 6.835 )4.589 
3 3.569 0.778 4.587 2.167 2.875 1.100 7.142 15.545 
4 3.859 0.934 4.132 1.895 3.110 1 .100 7.105 15.192 
1975 4.176 1.048 3.985 1.904 3.323 1. 105 7.332 15.060 
6 4.650 1.045 4.449 1.798 3.423 1. 114 7.335 15.802 
7 5.188 1.113 4.662 1.763 3.552 1.127 7.442 16.621 
8 5.812 1.095 5.307 1.798 3.694 1 .135 7.627 19.096 
9 6.470 1.120 5.776 1.895 3.808 1.140 7.843 21 .747 I 
.t:-
.t:-
I 
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